Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 4 | Issue 1

Article 4

Winter 2009

Is Work the Only Thing that Pays? The Guaranteed
Income and Other Alternative Anti-Poverty
Policies in Historical Perspective
Felicia Kornbluh

Recommended Citation
Felicia Kornbluh, Is Work the Only Thing that Pays? The Guaranteed Income and Other Alternative Anti-Poverty Policies in Historical
Perspective, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y. 61 (2009).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol4/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Copyright 2009 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy

Volume 4 (Winter 2009)

Is Work the Only Thing that Pays? The
Guaranteed Income and Other Alternative AntiPoverty Policies in Historical Perspective
Felicia Kornbluh*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

In the years since 1996, welfare has largely ceased to be an issue in mainstream
national debate. “Welfare reform,” a goal of Democratic and Republican administrations
and legislatures from the late 1960s to the middle 1990s, has likewise virtually ceased to
exist as an object of political attention. In a sense, then, and to a degree that my
colleagues in the feminist historical and advocacy communities could hardly have
anticipated, President Clinton was correct when he asserted publicly during his 1992
campaign that he could “end welfare” as policy makers had known it—and when he and
advisors such as Dick Morris suggested more privately that one grand gesture toward
“welfare reform” could put welfare to rest as a tool for Republicans to wield against
Democratic aspirants to political office.1 By acquiescing in this one regard to the
philosophical and practical agenda of the so-called “Contract with America” in the wake
of the Democratic debacle of the 1994 Congressional elections, President Clinton
succeeded at an act of prestidigitation that my colleagues and I could scarcely have
anticipated; he made welfare, poverty, and especially poor women raising children on the
economic margins disappear from public debate.2
One of the many unanticipated consequences of the recession of welfare from
public concern is that poverty has continued to hover beyond the margins of mainstream
policy debate even as economic and political circumstances have changed dramatically.
According to a recent issue of the New York Times Magazine, both Democratic and
Republican analysts suspected that the Congressional elections of 2006 may have marked
*

Associate Professor of History and Director, Women’s and Gender Studies Program, University of
Vermont; Ph.D., Princeton University, 2000; M.A., Princeton, 1994; B.A., Harvard-Radcliffe, 1989. The
author acknowledges the contributions to her thinking of Peter Edelman, Liz Schott, Julie Nice, and all of
the other participants in the Symposium, “Ten Years After Welfare Reform: Making Work Pay” at the
Northwestern University School of Law. She also acknowledges the assistance of Hendrik Hartog, Daniel
Rodgers, Elizabeth Lunbeck, Lizabeth Cohen, Daniel Horowitz, Anore Horton, and many others in helping
her think through the ideas that appear in this article.
1
For the underlying thinking behind Clinton’s decision to make welfare a target during the 1992
presidential elections, and that encouraged him to sign the welfare reform bill initiated by congressional
Republicans in 1996, see STANLEY GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF
THE NEW AMERICAN MAJORITY 110–11 (1995). Greenberg was the leading pollster for candidate Bill
Clinton in 1992, and a political advisor thereafter. On the legislation itself, see JOEL F. HANDLER &
YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 282–83 (2007).
2
THE CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE
HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994) (presenting a ten-point platform for Republican house candidates to run on);
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (1994) (same).
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the beginning of a transformation comparable to the one that occurred after the “Contract
with America” elections of 1994. 3 After 2006, Democrats were poised to consolidate
and extend their legislative majorities and, perhaps, to initiate the kind of electoral
realignment that comes only once or twice in a generation. Despite this turnaround,
welfare has remained below the radar. Moreover, issues of poverty, income inequality,
urban devastation, and the failure of women and children in particular to thrive
economically have barely registered in national political discourse.
One instructive exception was the 2008 presidential campaign of John Edwards.
Edwards made his concern about poverty a centerpiece of his bid for office. By returning
repeatedly to New Orleans, he reminded his audience about the extreme devastation in
some contemporary cities and about the racial dimension of the problem of the “two
Americas.”4 Edwards’ appeal energized many liberal voters and also resonated with
some evangelical Protestants who were rediscovering the issue of poverty.5 However,
even Edwards avoided focusing on welfare. Moreover, his rhetoric did not capture the
imaginations of enough Americans to make him a lasting candidate, nor did his antipoverty agenda remain at the center of political concern after Edwards departed from the
race.
From my perspective as a historian and a feminist advocate, the great weakness of
the Edwards agenda was the degree to which it failed to reflect the excellent work that
has been done in the past thirty years on the gender of poverty. By this, I mean
scholarship and advocacy that have emphasized the ways in which both the mainstream
economy and the social welfare state have privileged full-time, primary-sector male
heads of household, the ways in which that male-breadwinner model has failed for most
women, and the economic consequences of this lack of fit. Edwards’ agenda included
raising minimum wages, changing the voting procedures in union representation elections
so that workers could affiliate through “card checks,” reforming the National Labor
Relations Board, and increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).6 Such policy
solutions would not be irrelevant for women workers or for women whose partners are
full-time, primary-sector workers; on the contrary, the Edwards approach to “making
work pay” might raise family incomes significantly. However, these policies would not
fully address some of the most vexing and long-standing questions in U.S. social policy,
including the question of how to reconcile family parenting responsibilities—and the
3

Benjamin Wallace-Wells, A Case of the Blues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 44; see also
George Packer, The Fall of Conservatism, THE NEW YORKER, May 26, 2008, at 47; Eyal Press, Is The
Party Over?, THE NATION, June 2, 2008, at 11.
4
John Edwards’ Plan to Build One America, http://johnedwards.com/issues/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (“In
today’s Two Americas, it is no coincidence that most families are working harder for stagnating wages.”).
For the origins of the “two nations” image regarding poverty and wealth, see Benjamin Disraeli, THE TWO
NATIONS, excerpted in THE PORTABLE VICTORIAN READER 22, 22–23 (Gordon S. Haight ed., 1972); see
also GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE 489–503
(1983). For the image in regard to race in the United States, see ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (Scribner 2003) (1993).
5
See Sojourners, Presidential Forum on Faith, Values, and Poverty,
http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=action.display&item=pentecost07_candidates_forum (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009).
6
John Edwards, A National Goal: End Poverty within 30 Years,
http://www.johnedwards.com/issues/poverty (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). Specific proposals included
raising the minimum wage, tripling the EITC for childless adults, and reforming labor law to allow for
union representation as the result of card checks rather than traditional, secret-ballot elections. Id.

62

Vol. 4:1]

¶5

¶6

Felicia Kornbluh

deference our polity has generally shown toward parents in permitting them to make
choices about their children’s care—with an economic system in which wages from
mainstream employment are treated as the only legitimate source of income for all but the
wealthy and the elderly.7
The wisdom of the Edwards approach, one of making “work pay” through a variety
of policy approaches, has become a kind of consensus common sense among many
people who want to recreate an anti-poverty agenda in the post-“welfare reform” world.8
If enacted, such an agenda would certainly improve the circumstances of many of the
mothers who have joined the labor market as welfare (now Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families, or TANF) clients or as former clients who have reached their eligibility
limit for benefits. But such an agenda would underline, rather than dismantle, the
favoritism toward a relatively narrow group of citizens within our social polity; it would
continue the relative silence U.S. policy makers have maintained on the issue of longterm unemployment; and it would continue the biases not only of gender but also of
ability and disability that are inherent in a wage-work-centric approach to preventing and
healing the social problem of poverty.9 Moreover, although surely more politically
palatable than “welfare,” the passage of such an agenda would hardly be assured even
under the Obama White House and Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress.
Drawing upon historical examples and the wisdom of advocates as well as
researchers, two alternative approaches suggest themselves. The first follows the
example of the U.S. House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, which
was itself a response to the changes that occurred in social policy in the early 1980s, and
was ultimately a casualty of the Republican legislative takeover in the middle 1990s.10
This approach takes the family, whether straight or gay, single-parent or two-parent, as
the unit of political analysis. The family-based agenda treats universal social services as
7

For a review of scholarship that addresses the place of women and families in U.S. social policy, see
Felicia Kornbluh, Women’s History with the Politics Left In: Feminist Studies of the Welfare State, in
EXPLORING WOMEN’S STUDIES: LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 236, 236–55 (Carol Berkin et al. eds.,
2006).
8
See generally MAKING WORK PAY: AMERICA AFTER WELFARE (Robert Kuttner ed., 2002) (compiling
articles examining the effects of “welfare reform”).
9
For alternative frameworks for social policy that might be consistent with a guaranteed income approach,
see Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1 (2008) (arguing for policies that recognize the universality of vulnerability in human life, and
that distribute benefits on the basis of their ability to address vulnerabilities rather than on the basis of their
ability to reward market work); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006) (arguing for a “capabilities” approach that respects differences
in physical and intellectual ability). I have explored the links between a gendered and a disability-sensitive
critique of U.S. social policy. See Felicia Kornbluh, Jacobus TenBroek’s Fourteenth Amendment: Civil
Rights, Disability, and Law in the Work of America’s Leading Blind Activist Before the 1960s, Society for
Disability Studies Conference, Bethesda, Maryland (2006) (unpublished paper, on file with author); Felicia
Kornbluh, Virtually Normal: Jacobus TenBroek, Blindness and Masculinity in Early Disability Rights
Discourse, Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia (2004) (unpublished paper, on file
with author).
10
See STAFF OF H. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 98TH CONG., CHILDREN, YOUTH,
AND FAMILIES: 1983 (Comm. Print 1983); STAFF OF H. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND
FAMILIES, 99TH CONG., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN POVERTY: BEYOND THE STATISTICS (Comm. Print
1985); STAFF OF H. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 100TH CONG., AMERICAN
FAMILIES IN TOMORROW’S ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1987); STAFF OF H. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 100TH CONG., A DOMESTIC PRIORITY: OVERCOMING FAMILY POVERTY IN AMERICA
(Comm. Print 1988).

63

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

¶7

¶8

[2009

a key solution to the poverty problem. Universal child care on a French or Swedish
model, or healthcare on a Canadian or British model, would relieve poverty by removing
a set of expensive and necessary family expenditures from the market (“decommodification,” in Gosta Esping-Anderson’s phrase).11 Such services speak to family
needs that stretch across the income spectrum, as well as across other social differences,
and so they alleviate poverty without stigmatizing the poor. Although politically difficult
to initiate, such proposals are more appealing the more they address the circumstances
and values of people who already know that they are compelled to over-identify with
their market work.
History has shown that universal social policies, once implemented, generate
majoritarian voting coalitions that make them nearly impregnable to challenge. This has
certainly been the case with the Canadian healthcare system (remarkable given that in the
early 1970s, the Canadian system was a patchwork, much like the system in the
contemporary United States) and the U.S. system of Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance
(“Social Security”).12 In designing a family-based policy agenda, I would explicitly
include services that advocates often think of as serving middle-class families, but which
are also critical for lifting families out of poverty or helping them stay in the middle
class. These include mortgage and housing assistance and the financing of higher
education.
Drawing upon my research on the welfare rights campaigns of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the other alternative that suggests itself is a strategy based on income rather
than on mainstream work.13 This is, in a sense, the simplest possible approach to
poverty, in that it proposes that each adult citizen receive a basic adequate income from a
combination of market and state resources; if someone is not earning a wage, then she or
he receives substantial support from the government and, in the case of a low wage,
receives a smaller supplemental grant. Forty years ago, this approach produced a variety
of proposals for what was termed the “national guaranteed income” or “negative income
tax.”14 In recent years, its most significant embodiment has been the EITC, which has
substantially grown in value and coverage since the early 1990s.15 Other income-based
11

GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 21–23, 26–28, 35–54, 128–29,
182–84 (1990).
12
Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the
United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411, 411 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
But see Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative View,
in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 437, 437–59 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1990). On
healthcare, see JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED: WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS NO NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE (2005).
13
See generally FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN
MODERN AMERICA (2007) (chronicling the history of the welfare rights movement).
14
Felicia Kornbluh, A Right to Welfare? Poor Women, Professionals, and Poverty Programs, 1935-1975
35–188 (November, 2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author).
15
On the history of the EITC, see BRIAN STEENSLAND, THE FAILED WELFARE REVOLUTION: AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE OVER GUARANTEED INCOME POLICY 178–80 (2008). For general discussion of the EITC, see
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, The Earned Income Tax Credit, http://www.cbpp.org/pubs/eitc.htm
(last visited March 19, 2009). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes the rise in state, as well as
federal, EITC’s. As of June 2008, twenty-four states had EITC’s, and twenty-one had refundable EITC’s,
meaning that people who qualified were not only exempt from state taxes but also received income
supplements from the state. See JASON LEVITIS & JEREMY KOULISH, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS: 2008 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 6, http://www.cbpp.org/6-608sfp.pdf. Moreover, Democrats in the U.S. House and Senate, and local leaders, such as Mayor Michael
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approaches include Bruce Ackerman’s and Anne Alstott’s idea of endowing each citizen
with a “stake,” or a one-time income grant distributed in early adulthood. Other
alternatives include what has been dubbed a Basic Income Grant. This proposal has
gained adherents throughout the world but especially in Europe and Latin America, and is
the idea behind the fund (created from oil revenues) that the state of Alaska has used to
supplement the incomes of all of its citizens.16
¶9
An income-based approach to poverty lacks the political appeal of approaches that
take the labor market as their starting point. However, it has many advantages. First, an
income-based approach recognizes the reality of long-term and structural unemployment
as well as under-employment.
¶10
Second, it allows for consideration of the particular vulnerability to poverty of
women, especially mothers of young children. Women have been disproportionately
poor, and disproportionately the objects of anti-poverty policy, throughout AngloAmerican history. The contemporary reasons for women’s disproportionate need for
state-funded economic aid include segregated labor markets; part-time work; limited
access to private-sector benefits or to public-sector ones that are based on wages or hours;
post-divorce or post-separation declines in income; limited child support awards or
collections; and domestic violence and the costs of fleeing an abuser.17 As recent
research has demonstrated, the women on late twentieth and early twenty-first century
welfare rolls have overwhelmingly been victims of intimate violence.18 Family
homelessness, which arose in the 1980s, has been largely a product of intimate violence,
on the one hand, and a tattered system of mental health and income supports, on the
other.19
Bloomberg of New York City, have endorsed expanding the EITC for childless workers. As of October,
2007, childless workers were eligible for Earned Income Tax Credits, but the value of these credits was
very low, a maximum of $438 per year, or less than one-tenth of the maximum EITC for a family with one
child. See AVIVA ARON-DINE & ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, WAYS AND
MEANS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN CHARLES RANGEL’S PROPOSED EXPANSION OF THE EITC FOR CHILDLESS
WORKERS: AN IMPORTANT STEP TO MAKE WORK PAY 2, http://www.cbpp.org/10-25-07tax.pdf.
16
I discuss these alternatives in KORNBLUH, supra note 13, at 8–9; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE
ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 4–5, 21–44 (1999); Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund
Dividend: An Experiment in Wealth Distribution, in PROMOTING INCOME SECURITY AS A RIGHT: EUROPE
AND NORTH AMERICA 549 (Guy Standing ed., 2004) (discussing the creation of the Alaska Permanent Fund
as a source of income for citizens of Alaska and the fund’s concept of a basic income as applicable to other
regions); GUY STANDING, BEYOND THE NEW PATERNALISM: BASIC SECURITY AS EQUALITY 214 (2002)
(examining various approaches to a basic income taken in European and South American countries).
17
For discussions of the reasons that women need public aid, see HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 1, at
19, 26, 39, 77, 303; DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA, at xi (2004)
(discussing women as the majority of the “working poor”); Mary Corcoran, Greg J. Duncan & Martha S.
Hill, The Economic Fortunes of Women and Children: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
in WOMEN AND POVERTY 7 (Barbara C. Gelpi, et al. eds., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1986) (1983); Diana M.
Pearce, Toil and Trouble: Women Workers and Unemployment Compensation, in WOMEN AND POVERTY
141 (Barbara C. Gelpi et al. eds., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1986) (1983); WOMEN’S ECONOMIC AGENDA
WORKING GROUP, TOWARD ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR WOMEN: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR CHANGE 11–19
(1985).
18
See Richard Tolman & Jody Raphael, A Review of Research on Welfare and Domestic Violence 56 J.
SOC. ISSUES 655 (2000) (summarizing and critiquing research on the link between welfare and domestic
violence); JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE: BATTERED WOMEN, WELFARE AND POVERTY (2000)
(chronicling one woman’s experience of domestic abuse while on welfare as a tool to increase
understanding of how domestic violence perpetuates reliance on welfare by domestic violence victims).
19
See generally The National Center on Family Homelessness, Women, Co-Occuring Disorders and
Violence Study, Ellen Bassuk, Director, http://www.familyhomelessness.org/work_past_women.php (last
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Third, an income-based approach de-stigmatizes the poor, at least in theory, in that
it rests on the idea that all citizens are vulnerable to periods of low income. This
approach promotes as a component of citizenship the right to be free from poverty
regardless of its origins. Negative income taxes and similar policies gather together in
their recipient pool the very poor and the so-called “working poor,” and suggest a
political coalition between these groups. Although not universal in the sense of offering
a benefit to people of all social classes, income-based policies are at any rate not
categorical in their application (unlike TANF, Supplemental Security Income, and other
policies whose lineage begins with the Social Security Act of 1935) and do not therefore
demand the separations between groups of people that proved so devastating to both the
reputations and the political health of the categorical programs in the decades after the
1930s.20
¶12
In what follows, I explore the meaning and history of the idea of a minimum
income for all U.S. citizens. Although this idea seems far from mainstream policy
consideration in the twenty-first century, I argue that it was an object of serious
discussion by intellectuals, advocates, and government officials during the Johnson and
Nixon years. I explore the reasons for its emergence, and both the strengths and
weaknesses of the idea as it came into being. I frame my discussion with reference to the
Nixon administration’s Family Assistance Plan (1969-1972), a massive national income
support program, which was the most historically significant effort to translate the idea of
a guaranteed income into a concrete legislative proposal.
II. A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE IDEA
¶13

In January, 1969, as Richard Nixon assumed the presidency, the idea of a minimum
income for all U.S. citizens was so commonplace that one political insider suggested it
was one of the two domestic policy proposals that could unite the Republican Party.21
The idea was nearly as common among leading Democrats, and among policy
intellectuals from all points on the political spectrum, as it was among Republicans.
From economist Milton Friedman to Senator George McGovern, a remarkable range of
political thinkers in the 1960s and early 1970s settled upon the income guarantee as a
logical next step in poverty policy, and as an important balance-wheel of what they were

visited March 19, 2009) (studying the effects of violence against women, especially mental health and
substance abuse).
20
See generally ALICE KESSLER HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN AND THE QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001) (discussing how seemingly neutral legislation
actually limited women’s employment and citizenship rights); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED:
SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994) (examining the evolution of the
welfare state through early programs to assist single mothers); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING
POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989) (looking at how views and
assumptions of welfare have shaped the political discourse).
21
On the idea of a guaranteed income, and the Nixon plan as a manifestation of this idea, see KORNBLUH,
supra note 13, at 78–188. See generally STEENSLAND, supra note 15. On the guaranteed income within
the Republican Party, see DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON
ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN 63 (1973); VINCENT J. BURKE & VEE BURKE,
NIXON’S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM 50 (1974). The insider was John Price, a founder of the young
Republicans’ group the Ripon Forum and, later, counsel to Daniel Patrick Moynihan at the Nixon
administration’s Urban Affairs Council.
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beginning to call the “post-industrial” economy.22 Guaranteed income proposals also lay
at the heart of the political program of the grassroots movement for welfare rights, a
movement of welfare recipients and their allies that had chapters in every major city of
the United States.23 These grassroots activists ultimately devoted an enormous amount of
energy to defeating Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan proposal, which contained a national
guaranteed income as well as work requirements for some recipients of aid. However,
they advanced their own proposal for a guaranteed income, the so-called Guaranteed
Adequate Income, which was set to a standard of living that exceeded mere subsistence
and contained no specific quid pro quo for recipients in the form of employment.24
¶14
The idea of the guaranteed income was that the national government should insure
the citizenry against extreme poverty. Like the categorical aid programs under the Social
Security Act, and unlike Old-Age Insurance under Social Security, most guaranteed
income plans provided that payments from the Treasury would go to those who could
demonstrate a need for them. Unlike the categorical programs, citizens only needed to
demonstrate low monetary income to establish need. They did not need to demonstrate in
addition that they were disabled from working, or entitled to receive financial help
because of the service they did to the nation by raising children. They did not need to
prove to caseworkers or local administrators that they were worthy of assistance on
account of their behavior. From both the political right and the left, the guaranteed
income proposals of the 1960s and early 1970s eliminated caseworkers and the layers of
state and local bureaucracy that administered the categorical programs. One version of
the guaranteed income, which Friedman advocated as an alternative to all other antipoverty policies, was a negative income tax that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
would administer along with other taxes. Under Friedman’s proposal, citizens or families
with incomes below a certain level would not only cease to owe taxes, but would receive
money back from the federal treasury.25
¶15
The idea of a guaranteed income represented a major departure in social welfare
thinking since the New Deal. A comprehensive, universal income guarantee would have
dulled the edge of many of the classic forms of stratification that existed within the U.S.
welfare state, including forms of stratification inherited from public poor relief in the late
eighteenth century, from private charity in the nineteenth century, and from the protowelfare state policies of the Progressive period.26 It would not, of course, have dulled the
22

For Friedman’s views, see MILTON FRIEDMAN WITH ROSE FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962)
[hereinafter CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM]. Friedman remembered his supports for the guaranteed income
and his growing disenchantment with the Nixon welfare reform proposal between 1969 and 1971, in
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, TWO LUCKY PEOPLE: MEMOIRS 381–82 (1998) [hereinafter TWO
LUCKY PEOPLE]. To understand McGovern’s minimum income, or “demo-grant” proposal, I rely upon an
interview with Alan Stone, Dir. of Gov’t Relations, Columbia Univ., N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 11, 1997).
McGovern retreated from his universal income proposal in August, 1972, eleven weeks before the
Presidential election. BURKE & BURKE, supra note 21, at 142.
23
KORNBLUH, supra note 13, at 48–51, 142–44.
24
Id. at 137–60. For more on the Nixon welfare proposal, see Felicia Kornbluh, Who Shot F.A.P.? The
Nixon Welfare Plan and the Transformation of American Politics, 1 THE SIXTIES: A JOURNAL OF HIST.,
POLITICS, & CULTURE 125 (2008); STEENSLAND, supra note 15, at 79–156; and JILL QUADAGNO, THE
COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 117–34 (1994).
25
For the IRS’ role and Friedman’s proposal, see discussion infra notes 76 to 87 and accompanying text.
26
On welfare states as systems of stratification, see ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 11, at 3–4 (“Social
stratification is part and parcel of welfare states. Social policy is supposed to address problems of
stratification, but it also produces it. . . . The really neglected issue is the welfare state as a stratification
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edge of distinctions between those who received private healthcare and other “fringe
benefits” and those who received public benefits, or between those who received
relatively well-paying public benefits based upon their earnings (such as Unemployment
Insurance and Old-Age Insurance) and those who received relatively miserly benefits that
were not based upon earnings.27 However, an income guarantee would have eased the
distance between workers at the low end of the income scale (and those, such as laundry
workers, farm workers, and many part-time workers, who were not covered by the OldAge or Unemployment Insurance programs in the middle 1960s) and the categories of
people who received public assistance between the 1930s and the 1960s.28 They would
all have been eligible for the same grants or wage supplements. The income guarantee
would have diminished the power within the welfare state of the wage-work ethic for
men and what social welfare historian Mimi Abramovitz has termed the “family ethic”
for women, since men who were outside the labor market and women who had neither
children nor male partners would have received the same benefits (scaled for family size)
as those in the labor market and/or in nuclear families.29 An income guarantee for all
citizens would also have delimited the position of relative privilege enjoyed by the
categorical aid recipients under Social Security, that is, between those who were, in
historian Linda Gordon’s phrase, “pitied but not entitled” and those who were not even
pitied under the New Deal state system.30
¶16
Advocates of the negative income tax first formulated the idea in the 1940s.31
However, it took fifteen to twenty years for the concept of ensuring that all Americans
had minimal incomes to find a place at the table of national policy. Postwar social
criticism concerning the relationship between the state and the economy, public poverty
policies, and the combination of the civil rights movement, black migration, and urban
riots raised aloft problems that the guaranteed income appeared to answer. The relevant
social criticism discussed the United States as an affluent society with a powerful and
ever-growing economy fueled by rapid technological change. However, the critics also
system in its own right.”). For a single volume on welfare practices from the late eighteenth century
through the twentieth century, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986).
27
On private benefits as part of the welfare state, see ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 11; SUSAN PEDERSEN,
FAMILY, DEPENDENCE, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WELFARE STATE: BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 1914-1945, 224–
88 (1993). On the rise of “fringe benefits,” see Beth Stevens, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal
Government Has Influenced Welfare Benefits in the Private Sector, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN
THE UNITED STATES 123 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988). On the “two-tier” welfare state generally,
considered particularly in terms of gender, see Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare
State: Workmen’s Compensation and Mothers’ Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 123 (Linda
Gordon ed., 1990); GORDON supra note 20, at 293–95.
28
KORNBLUH, supra note 13, at 187.
29
On relationships between U.S. public welfare benefits and the labor market, see FRANCES FOX PIVEN &
RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971); KATZ, supra
note 20. On the “family ethic” or relative privilege of mothers over non-mothers, see MIMI ABRAMOVITZ,
REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(1988). For a comparative view, see Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE WELFARE STATE 231–60 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988). For complications of both the work-ethic and
family-ethic models, see Felicia Kornbluh, The New Literature on Gender and the Welfare State: The U.S.
Case, 22 FEMINIST STUDIES 171 (1996).
30
See generally GORDON, supra note 20.
31
The advocates were Milton Friedman and his fellow economist, George Stigler. See George J. Stigler,
The Economics Of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 358, 365 (1946) (proposing a negative
income tax as an alternative to a minimum wage).
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saw increasing unemployment or underemployment, particularly for men of color and
white working-class men, as a consequence of the very forces that led to affluence.
Journalistic and academic writing about poverty, and the anti-poverty rhetoric of the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, raised the problem of persistent poverty in sociogeographic corners of the United States that affluence somehow had missed.32 The social
movements, continued migration, and riots were constant reminders of African-American
discontent. By the late 1960s, when the Nixon Administration and its congressional
allies finally translated the idea of a guaranteed income into statutory language, it had
come to represent a kind of anti-New Deal and anti-War on Poverty, a response to the
problems of male under-employment, persistent poverty, and black rage that differed
from anything the United States had yet tried.
III. THE GUARANTEED INCOME AS A POLICY FOR THE 1960S
¶17

After its initial introduction in the 1940s, the guaranteed income idea resurfaced
within the increasingly heated public conversation about poverty in the Kennedy era. It
also emerged from the postwar conversation about American affluence. The starting
point for the closely related conversations about poverty and affluence was the effect of
new technology and new ways of organizing work on the post-World War II U.S.
economy. Worker productivity, national growth, and economic efficiency were seen to
have improved almost to dangerous degrees since the war. Michael Harrington noted
ironically about 1950s social thought: “There was introspection about Madison Avenue
and tail fins; there was discussion of the emotional suffering taking place in the
suburbs.”33 But postwar social criticism also had a structural dimension. The critics
predicted that productivity gains would lead to such a large decline in the need for labor
that social values would change, with the search for meaningful forms of leisure largely
replacing a commitment to remunerative work, with unemployment increasingly accepted
as a normal byproduct of the economic structure, and with consumption eventually
replacing production as the society’s paradigmatic economic activity and as the rock on
which Americans formed their identities.
¶18
The economic and social changes that the critics predicted were particularly
alarming because they signaled potential emasculation or feminization. It appeared
masculinity would have to change, if not diminish, as the social need for men’s work, the
physical intensity of their work, and their autonomy in performing it all declined.34 The
danger of feminization united men across the class spectrum and racial divide in 1950s
and 1960s social criticism, applying equally to David Riesman’s “other-directed” men of
the modern corporation,35 Paul Goodman’s unfree middle-class students,36 and the
32

Author’s conclusion from MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON WELFARE 79–123 (1989); ALLEN MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELLING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 218–221 (1984); WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE:
A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 280, 288–90 (The Free Press 1989) (1974).
33
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Penguin Books 1981)

(1962).
For a general discussion of masculinity and post-World War II social thought, see BARBARA
EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS AND THE FLIGHT FROM COMMITMENT (1983).
35
DAVID RIESMAN WITH NATHAN GLAZER AND REUEL DENNEY, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE
CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER 19–23 (Yale Univ. Press 1989) (1950). As Ehrenreich argues
throughout the work, Riesman referred to the “other-directed person” and not to men per se. However, the
34
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redundant working-class black men whom Daniel Patrick Moynihan believed needed to
“strut” to avoid obliteration at the hands of both large-scale economic forces and the
matriarchal women in their lives.37 All of these men were potentially vulnerable to the
shift in social emphasis from the activities that had been coded as masculine in Europe
and the United States since at least the early nineteenth century to those that had been
coded as feminine.38
¶19
The other side of the coin of considering the possibly deleterious effects of
American affluence was an increasing concern in the late 1950s and early 1960s about
the persistence of poverty amid prosperity. John Kenneth Galbraith showed both faces of
the coin in THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY.39 THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY decried a social overemphasis on production or industrial output that continued although such output spoke to
no obvious or natural needs. Galbraith claimed that much of the production that occurred
in the private market was more significant for keeping people working, and therefore
earning (and spending what they earned), than for meeting human needs.40 By way of
remedy, he urged “social balance” among the products produced in the private market
and in the form of investments in public goods, such as schools, hospitals, and roads,
which approached the levels of private investment that drove the postwar economy. 41 To
finance such investments, he urged higher taxes, especially sales taxes, which had the
twin virtues of raising revenue and discouraging consumption.42
¶20
The poverty Galbraith observed was of two types: “case” and “insular.” Case
poverty had to do with personal disabilities or shortcomings, whether physical or
psychological, that prevented people from taking advantage of opportunities.43 Insular
poverty, on the other hand, transcended the individual.44 It was the outcome of uneven
development and technological change, combined with a “homing instinct” that made

change in social character that Riesman described—from autonomy, inner-direction, and material wellbeing achieved through physically demanding work—was only meaningful in reference to stereotypes of
men’s activity and attitudes. “[A] book on ‘other-directed women’ would have been as unsurprising as a
book on, say, fair-skinned Anglo-Saxons, because other-directedness was built into the female social role
as wives and as mothers. The traits that Riesman found in the other-directed personality . . . were precisely
those that the patriarch of mid-century sociology, Talcott Parsons, had just assigned to the female sex.”
EHRENREICH, supra note 34, at 33–34. For similar concerns, see C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE
AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (Galaxy Books 1956) (1951).
36
PAUL GOODMAN, GROWING UP ABSURD: PROBLEMS OF YOUTH IN THE ORGANIZED SYSTEM (1960); PAUL
GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION (1964). This is not to say that Goodman had an easy
relationship with normative masculinity. See Paul Goodman, Memoirs of an Ancient Activist, in THE GAY
LIBERATION BOOK: WRITING AND PHOTOGRAPHS ON GAY (MEN’S) LIBERATION 22, 22–29 (Len Richmond
& Gary Noguera eds., 1973). Thanks to Bruce Aaron for the reference.
37
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT
AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLICY REPORT 39, 39–125
(Lee Rainwater & William Yancey eds., 1967).
38
See Victoria deGrazia, Introduction to THE SEX OF THINGS: GENDER AND CONSUMPTION IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 1–10 (Victoria deGrazia & Ellen Furlough eds., 1997).
39
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (Houghton Mifflin 1st ed. 1958) [hereinafter
GALBRAITH, 1st ed.].
40
Id. at 121–51.
41
Id. at 251–80.
42
Id. at 315.
43
Id. at 325–26.
44
Id.
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people desire “to spend their lives at or near the place of their birth” instead of moving
someplace more economically productive.45
¶21
Since he believed that poverty, especially of the “insular” type, was inescapable
under modern conditions, Galbraith urged state action to ameliorate it. He argued that it
was increasingly important to make employment available to everyone who sought it,
since the “discrimination” between those with jobs and therefore income, and those
without, was “altogether too flagrant.”46 As a further hedge against such discrimination,
Galbraith sought “a reasonably satisfactory substitute for production as a source of
income. This and this alone,” he argued, “would break the present nexus between
production and income” and allow the United States to move away from excessive
private output without generating mass unemployment and misery.47 The key
“substitute” that Galbraith proposed was unemployment compensation, which he
believed should be more widely available than it was in 1958, and available for longer
periods of time; in later editions of THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY, he openly advocated a
guaranteed income.48 To objections he anticipated to the idea of providing income to
citizens without demanding that they earn it by producing something, Galbraith asked:
[I]f the goods have ceased to be urgent, where is the fraud? Can the North
Dakota farmer be indicted for failure to labor hard and long to produce the
wheat that his government wishes passionately it did not have to buy? Are
we desperately dependent on the diligence of the worker who applies
maroon and pink enamel to the functionless bulge of a modern motorcar?
The idle man may still be an enemy of himself. But it is hard to say that
the loss of his effort is damaging to society.49
Galbraith asked his readers to consider a “divorce of production from security,” untying
the knot between a worker’s marketable output and his or her income.50
45

Id. at 326–27. In later editions, Galbraith specified his idea of island poverty further, to refer to “rural
and urban slums” in the South, the urban North, Appalachia, or Puerto Rico. “Race,” he argued, “which
acts to locate people by their color rather than by the proximity to employment [was] obviously” one factor
that created these islands of the poor. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 248–49
(Houghton Mifflin 4th ed. 1984) (1958) [hereinafter GALBRAITH, 4th ed.].
46
GALBRAITH, 1st ed., supra note 39, at 292.
47
Id. at 293.
48
In both the second edition of his ground-breaking book, which appeared in 1969, and the third edition,
published in 1976, Galbraith advocated a guaranteed income or negative income tax “as a matter of general
right and related in amount to family size but not otherwise to need,” in addition to public investments and
expanded unemployment allowances. He explained that the idea had seemed utterly impracticable to him
in 1958 but appeared reasonable later. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 266–67
(Hamish Hamilton 2d. ed. 1969) (1958) [hereinafter GALBRAITH, 2d. ed.]; GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT
SOCIETY 228 (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed. 1976) (1958) [hereinafter GALBRAITH, 3d. ed.].
49
GALBRAITH, 1st ed., supra note 39, at 290.
50
Id. at 292–307 (Chapter XXI, “The Divorce of Production from Security”). In later editions of THE
AFFLUENT SOCIETY, beginning with the second edition in 1969, Galbraith argued for un-linking production
and security especially for “those whom the modern economy employs only with exceptional difficulty or
unwisdom.” He did not propose that the government create jobs for such people or attempt to encourage
private employers to hire them: “Beyond a certain point,” he argued, “and given the shortage of qualified
workers that will exist, it is impractical to pull the uneducated, the inexperienced and the black workers into
the labor force and into jobs.” He also found a range of people, including “women heading households,”
whom he believed the government should sustain economically rather than seek to employ. GALBRAITH,
2d. ed., supra note 48, at 266; GALBRAITH, 3d. ed., supra note 48, at 227.
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As the 1950s became the 1960s, Michael Harrington’s THE OTHER AMERICA
succeeded Galbraith’s THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY as the touchstone text on poverty in the
United States. The difference between THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY and THE OTHER
AMERICA was one of emphasis more than of argument. Where Galbraith devoted most of
his book to the problems that affluence posed, and spent one chapter on the problem of
poverty, Harrington devoted his entire work to naming poverty as a social problem.
Harrington, like Galbraith, wrote of the contrast between large-scale prosperity and
persistent poverty, and argued that the two were not merely coincidentally but also
causally related to one another. “The other Americans,” according to Harrington, “[were]
the victims of the very inventions and machines that have provided a higher living
standard for the rest of the society. They are upside-down in the economy, and for them
greater productivity often means worse jobs; agricultural advance becomes hunger.”51
¶23
Galbraith and Harrington both understood postwar American poverty as a minority
phenomenon, but not one that could therefore be ignored or expected to wash away in the
general tide of economic growth. However, Harrington objected to Galbraith’s idea of
“island” poverty because, he claimed, it implied “a serious, but relatively minor,
problem.”52 In place of Galbraith’s typology, Harrington employed the idea of a
“culture” or “subculture of poverty” to argue that some people would not respond in
simple or predictable ways to economic change.53 Harrington’s poverty culture at first
emerged from structural and environmental factors, but later in life (or in a second
generation) was self-perpetuating. The culture was “an institution, a way of life,”54 “a
fatal, futile universe,”55 “an underdeveloped nation . . . beyond history, beyond progress,
sunk in a paralyzing, maiming routine.”56 He offered few specific governmental
programs to help the “other America.” However, Harrington argued that the selfperpetuating poverty culture resisted normal economic incentives and required a national
response.57
¶24
In January 1963, Dwight Macdonald underlined and expanded upon the arguments
of THE OTHER AMERICA in an influential essay for The New Yorker on Harrington and
poverty.58 The Macdonald review exerted a greater direct impact on public policy than
¶22

51

HARRINGTON, supra note 33, at 12–13.
Id. at 12, 82, 122.
53
Id. at 16. Harrington’s idea is virtually the same as Oscar Lewis’s idea of the culture of poverty, which
Lewis developed for explaining the resistance of some Mexicans and Puerto Ricans to economic growth
and modernization. Lewis had not yet, by 1962, when Harrington’s work appeared, applied the idea to the
poor minority within the United States. See OSCAR LEWIS, THE CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ (1961); OSCAR
LEWIS, LA VIDA: A PUERTO RICAN FAMILY IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY–SAN JUAN AND NEW YORK
(1966); Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 215 SCI. AM. 19 (1966).
54
HARRINGTON, supra note 33, at 18.
55
Id. at 129.
56
Id. at 166. Historian Michael Katz points out the coincidence of such descriptions of poor people (and
people of color) in the United States and in “underdeveloped nation[s],” and the most significant anticolonial political and civil rights movements of the twentieth century. “In the same years that social
scientists described them as passive, apathetic, and detached from politics,” writes Katz, “all over the world
previously dependent people were asserting their right to liberation.” See KATZ, supra note 32, at 36.
Particularly remarkable were passages in which Harrington compared the poor in the United States with the
poor of Asia, at the same moment that U.S. engagement in Vietnam was increasing steadily. “Like the
Asian peasant,” Harrington wrote, “the impoverished American tends to see life as a fate, an endless cycle
from which there is no deliverance.” See HARRINGTON, supra note 33, at 170.
57
HARRINGTON, supra note 33, at 166, 170–74.
58
Dwight Macdonald, Our Invisible Poor, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 19, 1963), reprinted in POVERTY IN
52

72

Vol. 4:1]

Felicia Kornbluh

Harrington’s own work, since it appears to have been Macdonald, and not Harrington,
whom John F. Kennedy read before formulating his anti-poverty proposals.59 Macdonald
also connected Harrington’s and Galbraith’s ideas about poverty and economic structure
to the idea of a guaranteed minimum standard of living for all U.S. citizens. He joined
the critical consensus when he warned about the potential social impact of industrial
automation.60 In addition, he joined Harrington in reflecting upon what he saw as the
special character of the “new minority mass poverty” of the age of affluence, a poverty
that was “isolated and hopeless” and probably “chronic.”61
¶25
In his New Yorker piece, Macdonald treated the essence of the poverty problem as a
problem of consumption. For Macdonald, participation in the consumer economy was
not the wasteful error it was for Galbraith; rather, it was the key sign of social
membership or inclusion in the United States of 1963.62 Macdonald defined poverty in
terms of model family budgets that the Bureau of Labor Statistics (B.L.S.) drafted to
describe “adequate living.”63 He commented on these budgets:
This is an ideal picture, drawn up by social workers, of how a poor family
should spend its money. But . . . only a statistician could expect an actual
live woman, however poor, to buy new clothes at intervals of five or ten
years. Also, one suspects that a lot more movies are seen and ice-cream
cones and bottles of beer are consumed than in the Spartan ideal. These
necessary luxuries are had only at the cost of displacing other items—
necessary, so to speak—in the B.L.S. budget.64
The “necessary luxuries” that poor people would need to do without, or for which they
would have to sacrifice other necessities, largely defined participation in postwar social
life for Macdonald. While he accepted the claim that general economic prosperity and
ameliorative welfare payments together had eliminated starvation in the United States,
Macdonald insisted this was unacceptable as long as “a fourth of us are excluded from
the common social existence. Not to be able to afford a movie or a glass of beer is a kind
of starvation,” he added “—if everybody else can.”65
¶26
Consumer deprivation, combined with the sense he shared with Galbraith and
Harrington that “a hard core of the specially disadvantaged” were relatively immune to
general economic expansion, also formed Macdonald’s justification for state action
against poverty. 66 “To do something about this hard core,” Macdonald argued:
AMERICA 6 (Louis Ferman, Joyce Kornbluh & Alan Haber eds., 1968).
59
KATZ, supra note 20, at 82.
60
Macdonald, supra note 58, at 16.
61
Id. at 20.
62
Author’s conclusion from id. at 9–10, 24.
63
Id. at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
64
Id. at 10.
65
Id. at 23–24.
66
Id, at 23. This language calls to mind that from the 1980s of sociologist William Julius Wilson. In THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987), Wilson, like
other “underclass” researchers, attempted to justify state action on behalf of poor people by insisting upon
their social aberrance and relative resistance to behavioral incentives that worked for other portions of the
population. For a similar view of the “underclass,” see EROL RICKETTS & ISABEL SAWHILL, URBAN
INSTITUTE, DEFINING AND MEASURING THE UNDERCLASS (1987). The author worked with Ricketts and
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[A] second line of government policy [other than macroeconomic] would
be required; namely, direct intervention to help the poor. We have had
this since the New Deal, but it has always been grudging and miserly, and
we have never accepted the principle that every citizen should be
provided, at state expense, with a reasonable minimum standard of living
regardless of other considerations. It should not depend on earnings, as
does Social Security . . . . Nor should it exclude millions of our poorest
citizens because they lack the political pressure to force their way into the
Welfare State. The governmental obligation to provide, out of taxes, such
a minimum living standard for all who need it should be taken as much for
granted as free public schools have always been in our history. 67
The article ended with a hope for the day when “our poor can be proud to say ‘Civis
Americanus sum! [I am an American citizen].’”68 Macdonald wrote: “[U]ntil the act of
justice that would make this possible has been performed by the three-quarters of
Americans who are not poor—until then the shame of the Other America will
continue.”69
IV. FEAR OF A POOR BLACK NATION? CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE INCOME IDEAL
¶27

The black civil rights movement influenced demands for a guaranteed income as
much as did the writing about poverty and economic structure in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Harrington’s and Macdonald’s visions of poverty as in part intractable relied
upon their common understanding that a meaningful fraction of the poor was African
American, excluded from the new prosperity by racial discrimination and by a lack of the
educational background they believed workers needed to fit into the changing labor
market.70 The civil rights movement, South and North, placed concerns about African
American economic advancement on the national agenda. Although the nexus between
poverty and racial difference was an old one in the United States, movement demands for
equal justice at the work place and the lunch counter, as well as at the polling place and
the court house, compelled many whites to see how little the affluent society had offered
black communities.71
Sawhill at the Urban Institute while they wrote the paper.
67
Macdonald, supra note 58, at 23. Macdonald was wrong to suppose that public schooling, even at the
primary level, had always been a common fiscal obligation in the United States. For discussions, see
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE IRONY OF EARLY SCHOOL REFORM: EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION IN MIDNINETEENTH CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS (1968); SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN
CAPITALIST AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1976); IRA
KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR, SCHOOLING FOR ALL: CLASS, RACE, AND THE DECLINE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC IDEAL (1985). Bowles and Gintis, and Katznelson and Weir, agree that schools were not
always publicly funded, although they disagree about whether universal public schooling ultimately
occurred because of employers’ demands or because of working-class demands.
68
Macdonald, supra note 58, at 24.
69
Id.
70
See HARRINGTON, supra note 33, at 75; Macdonald, supra note 58, at 12; GALBRAITH, 2d. ed., supra note
48, at 215–16, 266; GALBRAITH, 2d. ed., supra note 48, at 185, 227.
71
On links between civil rights and economic rights, see generally Kornbluh, supra note 14; THOMAS
JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2006); CHARLES HAMILTON & DONA COOPER HAMILTON, THE DUAL AGENDA: THE
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The civil rights movement’s Birmingham campaign and the March on Washington,
both of which occurred in 1963, enhanced the movement’s appearance of efficacy and its
leaders’ self-confidence. These two events also brought into focus the connections
between formal civil equality between blacks and whites and their relative economic
circumstances. In Birmingham, the multi-part agreement between the city’s merchants
and civil rights activists encompassed desegregating fitting rooms, wash rooms, and
lunch counters, hiring more black sales people and cashiers, and making a commitment to
improve African Americans’ employment options in the future.72 The March on
Washington united support for the freedoms at issue in the Civil Rights Bill then before
Congress with calls for full employment and an end to racial discrimination in hiring.73
In his “I Have A Dream” speech at the March on Washington, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
called for economic justice as well as for the formal equality that would allow whites to
judge his children not “by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.”74
King drew upon the imagery that Galbraith popularized, of “island” poverty. “One
hundred years” after the Emancipation Proclamation, King said:
[T]he Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast
ocean of material prosperity . . . . In a sense we have come to our nation’s
Capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the
magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every
American was to fall heir . . . .
Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro
people a bad check; a check which has come back marked ‘insufficient
funds.’ But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We
refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of
opportunity of this nation. So we have come to cash this check -- a check
that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of
justice.75
King followed this language with more sanguine, and familiar, calls for nonviolent
protest and an end to segregation in the South. But his gentler political rhetoric did not
negate his insistence that African Americans receive a raft off the island of poverty “upon
AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL AND ECONOMIC EQUALITY (2000).
72

THE BIRMINGHAM TRUCE AGREEMENT (May 10, 1963), reprinted in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL
RIGHTS READER 159, 159–60 (Clayborne Carson, David J. Garrow, Gerald Gill, Vincent Harding &
Darlene Clark Hine eds., 1991).
73
JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, 482–85 (1996). For a
greater focus on economic inequality between whites and blacks, and the argument that civil rights laws
and court-based strategies were “too little, and too late,” see John Lewis, Original Text of Speech to Be
Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial, reprinted in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER, supra note
72, at 163–65. For a contemporaneous observation of the March that was sensitive to its attention to black
poverty as well as to statutory civil rights, see I.F. Stone, The March on Washington, reprinted in IN A
TIME OF TORMENT , 122, 122–24 (1967).
74
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream, in NEGRO PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
400, 404 (Francis Broderick & August Meier eds., 1965).
75
Id. at 401.
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demand,” or his judgment that the “promissory note” from prosperous white to
impoverished black America was long past due.
¶29
The guaranteed income idea was only one of many possible responses to demands
such as King’s. In some ways, it was a politically expedient answer that accommodated
beliefs about black inferiority and ultimate inability to succeed in a predominantly white
labor market. Given the assumption of affluence—including the idea that the United
States economy had defeated the business cycle and that economic growth could continue
indefinitely—direct income grants to a multitude of people who were outside the labor
market, while costly in dollar terms, may have seemed a relatively small price to pay for
social peace. Guaranteed income schemes were politically expedient in that they allowed
bureaucrats, legislators, and intellectuals to avoid other, more politically complicated,
options, such as making a full-out effort to desegregate trade unions and private-sector
work forces. The guaranteed income was also an alternative to the full employment
policy that activists had sought at the March on Washington, and to the turn toward
increased taxation and increased investment in public goods that Galbraith had advocated
in THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY. However, despite their limitations, guaranteed income
proposals represented a response to the claims of civil rights activists that AfricanAmericans deserved equal treatment both economically and politically—and that
“equality of opportunity,” the great catch phrase of the Kennedy years, was not sufficient
to ensure economic equality.
V. MEN AND MARKETS
¶30

One major conservative contribution to the public conversation about guaranteeing
incomes was CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, by Milton and Rose Friedman, which appeared
in 1962. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM was a quintessential text of the Cold War Era, an
extended argument for capitalism as a system of “economic freedom and a necessary
condition for political freedom.”76 The work launched the idea of a negative income tax,
or guaranteed income administered by the IRS, into Republican policy parlance.
¶31
While they were hardly Keynesians, the Friedmans nonetheless treated as obvious
the conclusion of such Keynesians as John Kenneth Galbraith that poverty was a serious
and remediable social problem, and that the national government had a legitimate role to
play in alleviating it.77 However, the Friedmans judged virtually all prior anti-poverty
efforts by the government to be inefficient and corrosive of human freedom. They
argued for the abolition of corporate taxes and of the graduated personal income tax
because they saw them as coercive and confiscatory means of redistributing income.
They opposed minimum wages because they believed that minimums created more
poverty than they cured.78 The state, they claimed, could compel employers to pay a
wage but not to hire workers at that wage who were formerly paid (and whose marginal
product was presumably worth) something less.79 They also proposed to end such
substantive social welfare programs as public housing, which created and maintained
goods through the state that individuals with money to spend could more efficiently call
76
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into being through the private market. “[W]hy subsidize housing in particular?” the
Friedmans asked. 80 “If funds are to be used to help the poor, would they not be used
more effectively by being given in cash rather than in kind? Surely the families being
helped would rather have a given sum in cash then in the form of housing. They could
themselves spend the money on housing if they so desired.”81
¶32
Consistent with their preference for cash transfers over public provision of goods
such as housing, the Friedmans argued for a national system of cash transfers to replace
all forms of state social welfare provision. The instrument for enacting these transfers
was to be the income tax system.82 Writing ten years after the publication of CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM, Daniel Patrick Moynihan recalled that the negative tax idea had
originated with Milton Friedman’s frustration over technical problems with the tax
system:
In 1943, working in the Treasury Department on income-tax matters, he
became concerned about the problem of fluctuating earnings. Given
graduated tax rates, persons whose incomes rose and fell from one year to
the next paid more tax over a long period than persons with equivalent
gross earnings whose annual income was steady. This inequity was
especially pronounced among low-income workers who moved back and
forth from a zero tax bracket to a positive one. Friedman conceived of a
negative income tax to even things up. In a good year such a worker
would pay taxes to the Treasury; in a bad one, the Treasury would pay
taxes to him. By the late 1940s it had further occurred to Friedman and
his fellow economist George Stigler that a negative income tax could do
more than smooth some of the bumps in the citizen’s experience with
Form 1040. It could become a permanent device for eliminating poverty:
that is to say, it could be paid routinely to persons whose income never
entered the positive brackets.83
In 1962, Milton and Rose Friedman justified the negative income tax exclusively as an
anti-poverty measure. They argued that such a system was superior to conventional
public welfare measures because it answered the problem of poverty most directly.84
Moreover, a negative income tax made “explicit the cost borne by society” for social
welfare—as opposed to the patchwork of social policies that obscured their total costs.85
The proposal was attractive to the Friedmans because it was “outside the market,” unlike,
for example, minimum wages, which structured employer choices, or a national
healthcare system, which would compete with and in part supplant privately provided
goods. Finally, they favored negative income taxes because, although they might reduce
the work ethic somewhat by softening the sting of an individual’s choice not to work,
80
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they also allowed for work incentives. “An extra dollar earned,” they wrote, would
“always mean[] more money available for expenditure.”86
¶33
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM did not truck at all with the political process by which a
negative income tax might be created, or by which the many constituencies with vested
interests in existing social welfare programs might be persuaded to prefer a negative tax.
Political considerations entered the text only insofar as the Friedmans worried that
negative taxes might become excessively high, coercive, or confiscatory in the way they
believed graduated income taxes had become.87 They barely discussed the most
politically contentious of social welfare programs—those that were the least amenable to
substitution by the negative tax—the categorical programs under Social Security for
people with no other incomes. When they discussed the way in which citizen-recipients
of negative taxes could raise their incomes by working for wages, they did not consider
whether mothers with young children, or the other recipients of categorical programs,
would be able to do this.
VI. THE WAR ON POVERTY, THE WAR IN VIETNAM, AND THE GUARANTEED INCOME IDEA
¶34

The guaranteed income idea rose to the fore in policy circles at the same time as a
range of other ideas for alleviating poverty. John F. Kennedy committed himself to doing
something about poverty during his pivotal West Virginia primary campaign in 1960.88
However, the Kennedy administration did not advance a particularly ambitious antipoverty program, in part because of its thin electoral mandate and the opposition it faced
in Congress from Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats.89 Consistent with
Galbraith’s idea of “island” poverty, the Kennedy administration focused upon an agency
called the Area Redevelopment Agency, which made federal grants to regions that were
seen to have been left behind by the new economy.90 Kennedy administration officials
also funded anti-poverty programs through the President’s Committee on (and later the
federal Office on) Juvenile Delinquency, which proceeded on the theory that social
factors, especially poverty, inspired juvenile crime and misbehavior.91
¶35
After Kennedy’s assassination, the Johnson administration pursued a major tax cut,
the Civil Rights Act, and a legislative and administrative war on poverty.92 The
86

Id.
Id. at 194–95.
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guaranteed income idea does not appear to have figured much in the thinking of Johnson
or his wise men when they planned the War on Poverty, or drafted its central legislation,
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.93 However, the guaranteed income idea survived
the Johnson presidency. The key bureaucracy of the War on Poverty, the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO), contained a column of guaranteed income advocates.94
While most of the agency’s institutional resources went to managing the Community
Action Program and other programs, OEO also contained a cadre of policy experts who
repeatedly drafted plans for a negative income tax.95 In the first year of OEO’s existence,
for example, they drafted a five-year plan, which they did not release to the public or to
Congress, which included a provision for a negative income tax of $1738 per year for a
family of four with no other income.96 OEO staff incorporated some version of a
negative income tax into plans they drafted in 1966, 1967, and 1968.97
¶36
Even without Johnson’s backing, the negative income tax appealed to a group of
policy professionals in Washington, D.C. It was at once grand enough in scale to appear
to meet the “welfare crisis” and sufficiently different from both New Deal and Great
Society social policy that it appeared as a departure. As a potential answer to the labormarket position of African American men, the stock of the guaranteed income idea rose
as riots and Northern protests illuminated the unemployment of black men in the cities,
the gap between their unemployment rates and those of whites, and their fury.98 The
draft and the Vietnam War made the work situation for men of color temporarily less
stark than it would otherwise have been. But returning veterans without jobs were grim
reminders of the weakness of war as an employment policy.99
¶37
Proposals for the guaranteed income and negative income tax enjoyed a renaissance
later in the 1960s. A front-page Wall Street Journal article in 1966 reported the Johnson
administration’s interest in the guaranteed income concept; the idea also had the support
of John Kenneth Galbraith and New York’s liberal Republican mayor, John Lindsay. 100
JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE TAPES 24–149 (Michael Beschloss, ed., 1997). The tax cut and the civil rights bill
were two pieces of legislation left by Kennedy at the time of his death. Johnson pursued the tax cut
aggressively in part to reassure Wall Street after the death of the President, as well as to warm business
people and middle-class constituents to his administration.
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However, the article also reported that “Vietnam-induced budget strains and Johnsonian
political caution” prevented the Administration from doing more than tinkering with
existing welfare programs.101 It took a few more years of urban riots—from the Harlem
conflagration in 1964 through the national response to King’s assassination in April
1968—and continued protests by the Northern civil rights movement to persuade many
whites that the War on Poverty was not following a sufficiently ambitious battle plan.
“In retrospect,” Moynihan wrote, “the negative income tax appears very much an idea
whose time to come was the late 1960s.”102
¶38
In January 1967, Johnson responded to pressures internal and external to his
administration and announced his intention to appoint a national commission on income
maintenance programs, the central mission of which was to report on the strengths and
weaknesses of the guaranteed income and negative income tax ideas.103 At the same
time, OEO researchers began a study of the effects of the negative income tax upon one
thousand families in New Jersey.104 Johnson ultimately appointed the incomemaintenance commission, headed by industrialist Ben Heineman, in 1968; nearly one
year into the Nixon administration, the Heineman Commission reported its findings, and
its strong support for a negative income tax, in a report titled POVERTY AMID PLENTY,
THE AMERICAN PARADOX.105
VII.
¶39

A REPUBLICAN WAR ON POVERTY?

While the Johnson Administration dawdled in its approach to guaranteeing
incomes, East-Coast Republicans came increasingly to favor the idea. The “welfare
crisis” in New York made Governor Nelson Rockefeller a ready audience for such a
proposal. He joined John Lindsay, Mayor of New York and a fellow liberal Republican
with similar ambitions for national office, in answering the rising welfare rolls and
continuing activist pressure with a call for the federal government to remake the welfare
system.106
Jobless Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1966, at 1. The article dated the beginning of elite political interest in
the negative income tax to 1964, “when budget surpluses and more tax cuts seemed likely . . . . The
negative income tax,” Otten noted, “has twice been urged on the White House by Sargent Shriver’s
poverty-fighters, once in 1964 and again in 1965. Early this year the National Commission on Technology,
Automation and Economic Progress, consisting of business, labor and academic leaders, and more recently
the planning council for the White House conference on civil rights advocated that the Government provide
some uniform, nationwide floor under family income.”
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Rockefeller first responded to the “welfare crisis” by taking measures at the state
level that were consistent with federal law: In 1968, he proposed a “flat grant” for all
public assistance recipients that was slightly higher than the basic grants they had
previously received.107 The “flat grant” proposal would have saved New York State
money, and would have made welfare administration more manageable, because it
allowed little discretionary spending authority to local welfare officials or individual case
workers.108 Previously, these low-level officials had the power to calculate family
welfare budgets (within given parameters but also according to their assessments of
family needs) and to disburse potentially large additional grants for families’ occasional
needs.109 The “flat grant” was not a minimum income because it did not apply to all
citizens. However, it was a definite stride toward a minimum income, away from the
budget-based, highly discretionary welfare system of the period between 1935 and the
late 1960s.
¶41
The fate of Rockefeller’s “flat grant” proposal presaged the fate of the Family
Assistance Plan under President Nixon. Rockefeller’s plan failed in the New York State
legislature in 1968.110 Welfare activists opposed it because they saw it as in effect a grant
cut and as a blow to their opportunities for organizing against local targets that had
discretionary spending authority; state legislators also opposed the plan, which they saw
as a generous guaranteed income for New York City welfare clients.111 A less generous
proposal passed in 1969.112 While the proposals were being debated, and even after New
York changed its welfare law, protests continued.113
¶42
Rockefeller, Mayor Lindsay, and Lindsay’s Welfare Chief Mitchell Ginsberg
viewed the administration of public assistance programs as unmanageable. They argued
that the costs could no longer be borne by the cities or states alone.114 They all ultimately
called upon the federal government for relief, seeking to nationalize programs that had
been radically decentralized since their inception in the New Deal. At hearings on the
Nixon welfare proposals before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Lindsay argued that
the “single most far-reaching reform would be complete Federal financing and
administration of the welfare system . . . . It would be unthinkable not to have Federal
financing and administration of the social security system . . . . From the perspective of a
few years, it would seem unthinkable to do it any other way.”115
¶43
To clarify his options, both as Governor of New York and as a potential candidate
for the Republican nomination for President, Rockefeller organized a small conference on
CHARLES MORRIS, THE COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE LIBERAL EXPERIMENT 66–
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welfare options in March 1967. Moynihan remembered this conference as a “formative
event” in the coalescence of Republican sympathy for the guaranteed income idea. 116
The meeting debated the merits of a negative income tax versus those of a European-style
family allowance, with Milton Friedman speaking for the former and Moynihan for the
latter. 117 A steering committee of participants at the meeting, headed by the Chief
Executive Officer of the Xerox Corporation, and composed primarily of other corporate
executives, approved both ideas but expressed a preference for the negative income. 118
After Rockefeller’s conference, this steering committee continued to press for replacing
the welfare system with either a family allowance or negative income tax, and brought its
recommendations before a business-oriented lobbying group, the Committee for
Economic Development, in May 1968.119 Although Rockefeller did not promise a
negative income tax in his effort to win the Presidential nomination, in the 1968 electoral
season, the liberal Republican Ripon Society favored the idea, and the leader of the
House Republican Conference, Melvin Laird, edited a book that included Milton
Friedman’s brief for a guaranteed income.120
¶44
By the time of the 1968 Presidential election, the idea of a guaranteed income had
traveled a remarkable distance from its origins in the margins of John Kenneth
Galbraith’s vision of an affluent postwar society or the efforts of Milton and Rose
Friedman to find a philosophically palatable alternative to New Deal-style positive state
programming. In the spring and summer of 1968, Great Society and New Deal solutions
to the problem of maintaining social peace lay in shambles. Political and economic
elites, no less than mobilized groups of African American activists or disillusioned
college students, had ceased to believe that either public assistance or community action
could right the balance. For all of the reasons that explained its longevity throughout the
1960s—not least its elasticity as a concept and its openness to multiple interpretations—
the guaranteed income idea was poised to enter the domestic agenda of the incoming
President, virtually without respect to party.
VIII.
¶45

CONCLUSION

What does the intellectual and political campaign for a guaranteed income in the
United States have to offer attorneys and advocates concerned with poverty at the
beginning of the twenty-first century? First, and most importantly, the history of the
demand for a minimum national income serves as a reminder that “making work pay” is
not the only possible approach to anti-poverty policy. Indeed, as the economy falters and
the truly remarkable job growth of the 1990s and early 2000s appears to grind to a halt,
the economic analyses of John Kenneth Galbraith, Michael Harrington, and others may
be more relevant than they have been for many years. Few commentators would refer to
the United States at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century as an “affluent
116
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society” (although it is still a very wealthy society). However, many would recognize in
contemporary circumstances echoes of Galbraith’s, Harrington’s, and Macdonald’s
concerns about the effects of technology on the structure and size of the labor market.
The “discrimination,” in Galbraith’s language, between those with jobs and those without
has become extremely stark, as has the gulf between those with full-time, primary-sector
jobs with benefits and those who work outside this shrinking, privileged tier.
¶46
One of the most instructive elements of the history of the guaranteed income in the
postwar United States is the breadth of support that existed for it. While many
Democrats were intrigued with the idea, leading Democratic politicians, such as President
Johnson, were skeptical. But Republicans, such as Nelson Rockefeller, and conservative
intellectuals who opposed the welfare state, such as Milton and Rose Friedman, were
engaged with the idea. To some degree, advocates for poor people in the United States
since the 1970s have already learned that conservatives and libertarians may support
income transfers if they are conducted with minimal government bureaucracy, especially
if the agent of such transfers is the IRS. Thirty years of experience with the EITC has
provided good evidence of this. However, the EITC continues to be small relative to
family economic needs. It has been many years since advocates made a serious effort to
provide cash support, on a non-categorical basis, adequate to alleviate poverty to those
with minimal or no officially declared earned income. Although there are certainly
weaknesses to such a market-based approach to alleviating poverty, a guaranteed income
program that would allow individual recipients to decide for themselves how and where
to spend their money might appeal to conservatives and libertarians in ways that
traditional liberal social programs, such as those to build or subsidize housing or help
families purchase healthy food, are unlikely to do.
¶47
For women and their families, the history of the proposal for a national minimum
income offers both hope and a warning. The hope lies in the fact that guaranteed income
proposals were by design universal (or, if limited, limited to all families raising children),
in the sense that their only eligibility criteria were financial ones. If implemented today,
such a program would liberate impoverished women from the intrusive and moralistic
procedures they still must endure when they become clients of the U.S. welfare state.
Moreover, a universal citizenship income would make women raising children without
sufficient economic resources far less vulnerable politically than they have been for most
of United States history. By including low-income mothers in a general program for poor
people, a guaranteed income policy would make them part of a large group with some
political clout, and would eliminate the special categorical program that has served
women and children since the 1930s (today called TANF), with its tenuous hold on
national political sympathies. The warning lies in the way guaranteed income proposals
that were generated as a response to historically high rates of unemployment and underemployment might be used to justify the exclusion of women from the first-tier labor
market or from training programs for non-traditional jobs. At a moment when the federal
courts appear to be retreating from attempts to remedy sex-based discrimination in the
workplace,121 a guaranteed income program might become an excuse for laggard
enforcement of anti-discrimination mandates in the law.
121
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Similarly, for African Americans, the history of the idea of a guaranteed income
contains both promise and risk. Proposals for a national minimum income in the 1960s
were provoked by the demands of the civil rights movement and by policy makers’ fears
of urban riots. However, many African American activists demanded jobs rather than
government income supports, and others demanded jobs or income. Policy intellectuals
who offered income alone as a solution to African American unemployment and poverty
appear to have wanted an answer to civil rights demands that would be less controversial
among working-class white voters than special training programs and aggressive
enforcement of anti-discrimination mandates would have been.
¶49
Today, given that African American citizens still face egregiously high rates of
unemployment and under-employment, a national income policy would certainly help to
ease the economic disparities between whites and blacks. As in the case of mothers and
children, a universalistic, income-based program would also soften the political
vulnerability of social programs that disproportionately target citizens of color. The risk
in creating such a program is that its existence would help naturalize unemployment for
African Americans, and would become an argument against making investments in
public schools, adult education, training programs, affirmative action programs, or civil
rights enforcement.
¶50
Overall, the most successful solution to the problem of poverty in the early twentyfirst century is likely to be a combination of “making work pay,” a family-based strategy,
and a functioning support system of basic income for those who earn very little or
nothing. This hybrid approach to the poverty problem is both philosophically and
practically preferable to a one-dimensional approach. Many people in the United States
are simultaneously workers, parents, and consumers. Government has potential roles to
play in structuring the labor market and counteracting its weaknesses, ensuring that
families get the services they need, and helping people acquire what they need in the
consumer marketplace. None of these approaches has a monopoly on moral,
philosophical, or practical political legitimacy. Together, these multiple approaches
might point the United States toward a future not merely of ending welfare but finally of
moving beyond it.

(2009).
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